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8.1  Introduction 
Housing prices rose by  18% in real terms during the  1970s, delivering a 
$700 billion windfall to homeowners. Housing prices are projected to decline 
by  as much as 47% during the next few decades (Mankiw and Weil  1989), 
delivering a potential loss of $3 trillion to the next generation of homeowners. 
These changes certainly affect the accounting wealth of households, but do 
they really affect the welfare of households? More to the point, will the pros- 
pect of future housing-price downturns tarnish the golden years of retirement 
for the aging baby-boom generation? 
In  the conventional life-cycle model,  a  large decline in  housing prices 
should have a strong impact on life-cycle wealth and hence on retirement con- 
sumption and welfare. But there is growing empirical evidence that housing 
wealth changes don't  influence consumption and saving behavior. First, Venti 
and Wise (1991) showed that the annuitized value of housing wealth for the 
median  homeowner is  small  compared with  Social Security and  pension 
wealth, so that a 47% decline in housing wealth would have only minor effects 
on living standards of the median homeowning retiree. Second, only rarely do 
the elderly spend down their housing equity at retirement. Merrill (1984) and 
Venti and Wise (1990) found that, when the elderly move, they are as likely to 
move into a larger house as a smaller house. Given the scarcity of  reverse 
mortgages, this evidence suggests that the elderly either could not, or did not, 
tap into the housing windfalls from the boom years of the 1970s. Finally, Skin- 
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ner  (1989) and Levin (1992) found little evidence that changes in housing 
wealth among homeowners generated offsetting saving responses. Housing 
prices may  decline by  47%,  but if  younger homeowners don’t  save more in 
response to the price decline, and if retired homeowners don’t touch their hous- 
ing equity, then the price change will have little impact on overall welfare. In 
short, trends and fluctuations in house prices and housing equity would be just 
a sideshow.‘ 
This paper reconsiders the question of  whether housing wealth is a side- 
show. I address this question in three general models. The first is the orthodox 
certainty life-cycle model with the possibility of moving costs and the lack of 
well-functioning reverse mortgages. That is, one explanation for why housing 
wealth appears to be a sideshow is simply the presence of moving costs and 
the inability to tap into housing equity. The second model generalizes the life- 
cycle model to include a simple bequest motive or the existence of  mental- 
accounting  saving  behavior  (Shefrin  and  Thaler  1988). In  the  mental- 
accounting behavioral approach to saving, for example, housing wealth is 
“nonfungible”  (Levin 1992);  therefore changes in housing wealth in this model 
could have little impact on saving or lifetime welfare. 
Finally, the third model considers how uncertainty about retirement income 
or out-of-pocket health expenses determines the effect of housing wealth on 
consumption and saving. In the precautionary approach, owner-occupied hous- 
ing is used as a form of insurance; should the “bad” income or medical draw 
occur at retirement, housing equity is cashed out, both because of the need for 
additional cash and because the demand for housing services has declined. 
Each of these three models holds different predictions for two key behav- 
ioral parameters: (1) What is the marginal propensity to consume housing 
windfalls for existing (younger) homeowners? and (2) What is the propensity 
to consume out of housing wealth at retirement for older homeowners? I test 
each of these hypotheses, as well as the importance of potential housing wealth 
changes in consumption decisions, using data on saving and housing wealth 
from the 1989  wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and aggre- 
gate time-series evidence. 
The first behavioral parameter, whether people consume housing windfalls 
while they are young, is tested using two approaches: the Euler equation ap- 
proach using aggregate time-series data, and quantile saving regressions using 
panel microeconomics data. For the aggregate data, the estimated effects are 
large and quantitatively  important, swamping any wealth effects from the stock 
market. The panel data suggests a more modest effect, with a reduction in 
median younger homeowner saving of  1-2  cents for every $1 increase in hous- 
ing wealth, an amount consistent with precautionary saving and life-cycle 
models. 
1. With apologies to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990). 243  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
In the life-cycle model, the housing windfall is used in part to finance retire- 
ment consumption.  However, the PSID suggests that few retirees actually draw 
down their housing wealth in any given year (also see Sheiner and Weil 1992; 
Ai et al. 1990). For those who do “cash out,” it is often the consequence of 
changes in family composition such as widowhood, or because of  adverse 
events such as health declines. Using saving data constructed from the 1984 
and  1989 PSID wealth data, I estimate that for those who tap into housing 
equity, roughly 73% of the proceeds have been spent within four years. 
Neither the standard life-cycle model with moving costs and financial con- 
straints, nor the mental-accounting model or bequest model can adequately 
explain both empirical phenomena. In the life-cycle model, if housing wind- 
falls are reflected in higher consumption while young, there is less nonhousing 
wealth to finance consumption at retirement. Hence there must be some way 
to tap into housing equity while retired, to supplement  the depleted nonhousing 
wealth. In the mental-accounting  model, housing wealth is nonfungible (i.e., a 
sideshow) that is consciously set aside, so that windfalls are unlikely to be 
spent while the homeowner is young. In the bequest model, the housing wind- 
fall is spent while young: households simply use the money that had been set 
aside for their inheritance. In turn, these households would bequeath at death 
their now more valuable house. The problem with this explanation is that few 
younger households have enough liquid wealth to provide for their own retire- 
ment, much less hold additional wealth available for bequests. 
The precautionary saving model, however, can potentially reconcile both of 
the empirical findings that homeowners spend down housing windfalls while 
young, yet  do not  typically tap into housing windfalls while old. Housing 
wealth is a form of self-insurance that can be drawn upon in the bad state of 
the world in which liquid cash is needed and housing demand is low. Housing 
windfalls therefore reduce the need for other types of precautionary saving, 
and increase consumption among middle-aged homeowners. Because housing 
wealth is held as a contingency against future risk, many homeowners will not 
experience the adverse risk. Therefore in the population of elderly, only a small 
fraction will be observed to tap into their housing equity. In short, housing 
wealth is not a sideshow, but a key component in insuring against retirement 
contingencies. 
8.2  The Life-Cycle Model with Financial or Moving Constraints 
I first consider a very simple two-period life-cycle model. Because the major 
focus of this paper is on the saving behavior of middle-aged homeowners, and 
the dissaving behavior of the elderly, I assume that the first period corresponds 
to “middle age,” say between 40 and 60, while the second period corresponds 
to retirement, between age 60 and 80. The choice of initial housing is ignored; 
each individual has already purchased a house. Households may change their 244  Jonathan S. Skinner 
housing consumption at retirement in the second period, although doing so 
will entail a psychic moving cost.2 In considering these results, it should be 
kept in mind that these results focus on the roughly 75% of households who 
are homeowners before retirement, and ignores the behavior of renters who 
may  purchase houses once they retire (e.g., Venti and Wise 1989; see also 
Sheiner 1989). 
Let expected utility be written 
where Ci is consumption and hi housing in period i; 6 the time preference rate; 
and E the expectations operator. The endogenous indicator variable A is equal 
to one if the individual moves, and zero otherwise. The variable m is the psy- 
chic cost of moving. Venti and Wise (1990), for example, estimate that such 
moving costs are sufficiently high to prevent most elderly families from mov- 
ing, even when their housing equity diverges from their “desired” amount. To 
evaluate the magnitude, as well as the direction, of changes in consumption, I 
assume an isoelastic strongly separable utility function 
c;  -y  hf  -y 
U(Ci,  hi) =  ~  + IJ-. 
1-y  ’ 1-y 
The budget constraint is written 
+-  Y2  + [X(hr -  h:)  P + p,h:]  vh:P  + ~- 
l+r  (1 + r)*’ 
where r is the net rate of return, yl. are labor earnings in period 1 and retirement 
income in period 2,  pi is the user cost of housing (and the implicit return on 
housing as an investment, given that taxes are ignored), and P is the price of a 
unit of  housing in the second and subsequent periods; families are assumed to 
own the house in full at the beginning of period 1. Since everyone is initially a 
homeowner, consumed housing services, h,, is equal to owned housing assets 
h:.  In the second period, households may either move to a smaller house but 
remain owner-occupiers (h;” > h:  = h2),  or simply sell their house and be- 
come renters (h, > 0, hz = 0).  The house is sold at the end of the second 
period. 
There are two potential restrictions that prevent the individual from attaining 
the unconstrained optimum. The first is that moving costs m are sufficiently 
high that the household does not move. That is, maximum lifetime utility corre- 
sponds to the (discrete) choice between EU*(A = 0), in which no move takes 
2. To  simplify the model, I ignore the monetary costs of moving. 245  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
place but h,  = h,* = h?, and EU**(X = l), in which the move occurs, the cost 
rn is incurred, but the household is then free to choose a new level of housing 
services. Rather than focus on the explicit solution for whether the household 
moves or not, I will consider two cases in the analysis below. One is the case 
where few households move, because moving costs are high, or because nei- 
ther housing prices P nor second-period  income Y,  have unexpectedly changed 
by enough to make a move necessary. The second general case is one in which 
housing prices or second-period income have fluctuated by so much that most 
households are willing to undergo the moving costs rn to choose a new level 
of housing services. 
Moving costs may  restrict the ability of  the elderly to get access to their 
home equity. The absence of reverse mortgages is another potential constraint. 
In a reverse mortgage, the bank supplements income of  the “housing-rich” 
elderly, in return for title to the house at death. A 100% reverse annuity implies 
v = 1, while the absence of a reverse annuity implies v = 0 (if v is 0.8, for 
example, only 80% of the housing equity would be eligible for a reverse mort- 
gage). To  the extent that perfect reverse mortgages do not exist, perhaps be- 
cause of self-selection problems (so that v < 1) or because h,* > 0, there will 
always be “accidental” bequests of housing equity that yield no utility in this 
model. 
The budget constraint is simplified by  subtracting ph? from both sides of 
equation 3; when A  = 0, p2h: can also be subtracted from both sides. When 
the housing asset yields a normal return r, P = p,(l  + r)/r,  and equation 3 
is rewritten 
+ h,*(v -  A)]. 
Maximization of equation 1 subject to 4  yields the solution 
where the value of lifetime resources L and the denominator K are written 
P 
(1 + r)’ 
[X(1 + r)h? + h,*(v -  A)] 
Y2  (6)  L(u,  A)  = Y, +  ~  + ~- 
1 + r 
and 
To analyze how a change in the price of housing P affects consumption and 
saving, one must first make some assumptions about why the price of housing 
has risen. The simplest approach is to assume that p,  has increased, perhaps 246  Jonathan S. Skinner 
because of  demographic effects of  population growth on a fixed supply of 
land. Then 
5 
dC, -  dp2 = hhT(1 + r) (V -  X)  h: 
dP  dP  (1 + r)*  K(A)  K(X)  dP 




To develop the intuition of the model, consider the case in which utility is log- 
linear (y = l),  in which case p2 will not affect the denominator K, so that the 
second term on the right-hand side of  equation 8 can be ignored. Then the 
change in  C, is just the present value of  the discounted change in  housing 
prices, depending on whether the individual moves, or whether reverse mort- 
gages exist. This derivative holds only when the change in p2, and hence in P, 
does not precipitate a move (i.e., the change in P induces a switch from A = 0 
to A = I), and conversely. 
Table 8.1 presents numerical calculations for a combination of hypothetical 
cases depending on the value of  X and v,  under the more empirically relevant 
case in which y is equal to three. A number of  other assumptions were also 
made about the magnitude of the coefficients. For example, I assume that each 
period lasts for twenty years, first-period income is $40,000,  and second period 
income $20,000. The share of housing services is assumed to be 25% of in- 
come in the first period, so that normalizing p = 1  yields housing services h, = 
10,000. The annual interest rate r and time preference rate 6 were assumed to 
be 3%, which corresponds to 0.806 accumulated over twenty years. Below, I 
consider each of the hypothetical cases. 
Table 8.1  The Marginal Propensity to Consume from Housing Wealth and 
Housing Equity Reductions: Four Cases in the Life-Cycle Model 
Reduction in 
Moving Costs  Annuities  Housing Wealth"  (annualized)b 
Reverse  MPC from  Housing Equity 
No moving costs 
(m = 0, A = 1) 
No moving costs 
(m = 0, A = 1) 
Large moving costs 
(m > 0, A = 0) 
Large moving costs 
(m > 0,  A = 0) 
Perfect markets 
(v = 1)  0.025  -0.05 
Nonexistent markets 
(v = 0)  0.025  -0.05 
Perfect markets 
(v = 1)  0.014  -0.05 
Nonexistent markets 
(v = 0)  0  0 
"The annual marginal propensity to consume (MPC) in the first period from a $1 change in the 
value of  housing wealth. 
The  average implied fractional change in housing windfalls during the second retirement period. 
In other words, a value of -0.05  means that, for every dollar in housing windfalls, the life-cycle 
household will reduce equity at the rate of 5 cents per year, so that by the end of the twenty-year 
period, there is no equity remaining. 247  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
No Moving Costs, Perfect Reverse Mortgages 
Consider first the standard life-cycle model with perfect reverse annuity 
markets and with small or nonexistent moving costs, so that homeowners can 
both tap into home equity at retirement and costlessly adjust the size of their 
house. Then as table 8.1 indicates, the marginal propensity to consume out of a 
$1 windfall in housing wealth is only 2.5 cents.3  The results are not particularly 
sensitive to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, the interest rate, or the 
time preference rate; it is essentially a wealth effect that depends on the ratio 
of housing wealth to overall lifetime wealth. There are two reasons why the 
impact is so small. The first is that the shift in the value of the asset is spread 
over a large number of years, so the change in the flow of consumption in any 
given year will be relatively small. More importantly, though, the housing capi- 
tal gains are discounted back from the time when the homeowner actually sells 
the house. Table 8.1 also reports the annual (percentage) reduction in housing 
equity during the second period. The conventional life-cycle model implies an 
active reduction of housing equity at retirement, either by  moving to a rental 
unit or by reverse mortgage arrangements.  That is, if housing prices rise while 
people are young, life-cycle homeowners save less for retirement in other 
forms. To  finance retirement consumption, they cash out the now  increased 
housing wealth. No rational life-cycle homeowner dies with any housing eq- 
uity remaining. Table 8.1 reports an annual decline of 5% in housing equity; 
this is the yearly deaccumulation of housing stock that insures housing equity 
is exhausted at the end of the twenty-year second period. 
No  Moving Costs, Absence of Reverse Mortgages 
The life-cycle estimates above assume very  well functioning markets for 
reverse mortgages. Will the assumption that reverse mortgages do not exist 
make housing wealth a sideshow?  The answer is no. If moving costs are suffi- 
ciently low so that every homeowner can move, changes in housing prices will 
exert an effect both on consumption while young and dissaving while old that 
is equivalent to the life-cycle model with perfect reverse mortgage markets. 
The reason is that the ability to move, and the ability to obtain reverse mort- 
gages, are substitute methods for obtaining housing equity. As shown in table 
8.1, households also reduce their housing equity at an annual rate of  5% to 
insure that equity is exhausted by the end of the twenty-year period. 
Large Moving Costs, Perfect Reverse Mortgages 
Suppose next that the costs of  moving are recognized, so that few elderly 
choose to change their housing wealth. Suppose also that reverse mortgage 
markets function very efficiently, so that u = 1. Once again, housing wealth is 
not a sideshow. While individuals do not move during the second period, they 
can extract all of the housing equity through reverse mortgages, so they do not 
3. This is the annuitized annual flow of consumption over the twenty-year period. 248  Jonathan S.  Skinner 
die with any remaining housing equity. Because they cannot adjust the level of 
housing consumption in the second period, they cannot spend down their hous- 
ing wealth to the same extent, so the marginal propensity to consume from 
housing wealth in the first period is somewhat less, 1.4 cents, relative to the 
two cases considered above. There is still complete deaccumulation  of housing 
windfalls during the second period through the use of reverse mortgages. 
Large Moving Costs, Absence of Reverse Mortgages 
When both moving costs are large and financial barriers exist, housing 
wealth is a sideshow, in that the price of housing has no effect on saving or 
consumption decisions. Homeowners find it difficult to extract housing wealth 
in the second period, either because reverse mortgages are not available, or 
because moving costs are excessively high. If they cannot extract housing eq- 
uity while old, they will not spend housing windfalls while young. Because 
housing equity is held until death, it becomes an unintended bequest yielding 
no value to the (life-cycle) consumer, Table 8.1 reports that the marginal pro- 
pensity to consume from housing wealth while young is zero, and net deaccu- 
mulation of housing wealth while old is zero. 
In sum, the prediction of  the life-cycle model is that household wealth is 
treated in one of two ways: either households spend housing windfalls while 
young and draw down housing equity to tap into housing windfalls while re- 
tired, or they spend windfalls neither while young nor while old. 
8.3  Mental Accounting and Bequest Motives 
More general models of saving can also imply that housing wealth is a side- 
show. If families maintain “mental accounts” in the sense of Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988) and Thaler (1990), individuals  control their spending impulses by creat- 
ing “nonfungible”  types of assets that are either not spent or, if spent, are saved 
for emergencies. Levin (1992), for example, suggests that the marginal pro- 
pensity to consume out of housing wealth is low for those families near retire- 
ment. Hence an increase in housing wealth is not predicted to cause house- 
holds to  increase consumption. There are  two  predictions of  the  mental- 
accounting model. The first is that windfall housing gains will not be reflected 
in higher consumption levels while young; in other words, the marginal pro- 
pensity to consume from housing wealth is predicted to be zero for those who 
are not yet  retired. The second prediction is that housing windfalls will be 
spent when the retired households are in financial distress, and only after other, 
more liquid assets are spent (Levin 1992): 
Another approach is to consider how the presence of a bequest motive might 
4.  This scenario is also consistent with a standard life-cycle model in which tax-preferred  assets 
with the ability to step up the basis at death-that  is, housing-are  held longest, since they are 
most valuable as bequests. 249  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
affect predictions for how housing windfalls will affect consumption and sav- 
ing. There are two types of  bequest models; one in which bequests simply 
yield utility or value, and the other in which the utility of one’s descendants 
enters one’s own utility function. In the former case, housing windfalls would 
be consumed while young, with nonhousing assets previously earmarked for 
bequests devoted instead to financing retirement consumption, and the extra 
housing equity used for the bequest. In this scenario, one might observe a 
positive marginal propensity to consume housing wealth while young, with 
little drawdown of housing equity while old. Such a model presumes that there 
is enough nonhousing wealth, previously targeted for bequests, to provide li- 
quidity for the younger homeowner with housing windfalls. Empirical data 
suggest that median households near retirement hold only $6,600 in liquid 
wealth (Venti and Wise 1991). If one presumes that most of this wealth will be 
devoted to maintaining consumption during retirement, there would be little 
remaining for  bequest^.^  In other words, few families have the financial re- 
sources (and bequests) to make this story plausible. 
The latter approach to bequests, that parents account for their children’s util- 
ity functions, could imply that housing wealth would be a sideshow. If housing 
prices rise, parents may choose to pass along the windfall to their children so 
the next generation might afford the now more expensive housing. In other 
words, the dynastic bequest motive could neutralize the impact of housing 
wealth changes on consumption and saving. 
8.4  The Precautionary Saving Model 
To  this point, the life-cycle model made the strong assumption of perfect 
certainty: households know future disposable income levels, and plan accord- 
ingly. The risk of  shocks to income, health status, or widowhood during retire- 
ment could affect family saving and consumption decisions prior to and during 
retirement.6 To  capture the inherent uncertainty associated with retirement, 
consider a simple model in which there is a second-period good state, in which 
health and income remain favorable, and a bad state, in which a spouse dies, 
out-of-pocket medical expenses jump, or inflation erodes nominal pension 
payments. In the good state, the family does not sell the house, and the moving 
cost m is not incurred. In the bad state, the change in circumstances is suffi- 
ciently large that it is optimal to sell the house and incur the psychic moving 
cost m. Once the house is sold, the proceeds can be used to finance consump- 
tion or medical costs. Note that in this model, the possibility of a future bad 
5.  Of course, the possibility remains that the $6,600 represents liquid wealth after families have 
already spent largely from the housing windfalls of  the 1970s. There is little evidence that the 
amount of liquid wealth has fallen dramatically since the 1960s (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 
1995). 
6. See Deaton (1992). Carroll (1991), Carroll and Samwick (1992), Caballero (1991). Skinner 
(1988), and Zeldes (1989) for a fuller discussion of the precautionary saving approach. 250  Jonathan S. Skinner 
state of  the world can strongly affect consumption and  saving plans while 
young, even if in fact the bad state does not occur. 
The original utility function in equation 1 is rewritten 
where T  is the probability of  the good state, denoted by  superscript g, and 
(1 -  IT) the probability of the bad state, denoted by b. It is convenient, but not 
crucial, to assume that reverse mortgage markets are nonexistent. As noted 
above, in the good state the homeowner does not move, so that consumed (and 
owned) housing in the second period is simply h;. In the bad state, the home- 
owner moves, say because second-period disposable income Y, has declined. 
In this bad state, the individual has the opportunity to reoptimize with respect 
to housing consumed (and owned) in the second period.’ 
(10) 
and 
(11)  C; = S(l + r)  + Yi + h;P -  pzh& 
where S is saving from the first period. That is, the family supplements the low 
disposable income in the bad state (g  < Y5) by  selling the house and using 
the proceeds either for rent or for nonhousing consumption. 
This model can be solved easily for the parameters used in  the certainty 
model above, but with the assumption that in the good state, which occurs 75% 
of the time, disposable income net of  medical expenses Y, equals $25,833, 
while in the bad state, occurring 25% of the time, Y2  equals $2,500 (on average, 
Y, is $20,000, as in the certainty model above). Given this assumption, the 
marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth is calculated to be 1.0 
cents per dollar. The reason why the marginal propensity is relatively large is 
that a decline in housing wealth of  $1 would imply a $1 fall in consumption 
during the bad state of the world. And while this bad state occurs only 25% of 
the time, its impact on  saving is magnified by  the relatively high marginal 
utility of consumption in that state. 
While the precautionary saving model may resemble the life-cycle model in 
its implications for the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth 
in period 1, it differs in its prediction for the spending down of housing equity 
in period 2. Only in the bad state (25% of the time in the example above) does 
the household sell the house; otherwise there is no downscaling of  housing 
wealth. 
Before one can really test whether housing wealth affects saving and con- 
Consumption in each state is 
c; = S(1 + r) + q, 
7.  If the homeowner  moves, he or she would be wise to set h; = 0, given that reverse mortgages 
are assumed unavailable. I assume that homeowners do in the simulations below. 251  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
sumption, one must first establish that housing wealth is an important compo- 
nent of financial resources at retirement inclusive of Social Security and pen- 
sion wealth. Results from the PSID suggest that, while the annuity flow of 
housing is relatively unimportant for the median homeowner in the sample, it 
is quantitatively large-as  much as 50%  of money income-for  a sizable frac- 
tion of lower-income and older retirees. In the sections that follow, I consider 
three empirical questions. The first is whether the magnitude of housing price 
changes on consumption and saving are large enough to matter. The second 
and third are, as noted above, whether families spend housing windfalls, and 
whether they dip into housing equity at retirement.  A negative answer to ques- 
tion one, or to both two and three, would suggest that housing wealth is unim- 
portant in determining the financial status of households at retirement. 
8.5  Is Housing Wealth Important in the Financial Security of 
the Elderly? 
Is the magnitude of  housing equity large enough to make a difference in 
retirement consumption?  Venti and Wise (1991) suggest that the reverse mort- 
gage could supplement income for the median retired families by only 4-10% 
of their existing income. That is, even a complete loss in (annuitized) housing 
equity would have  little impact on consumption. These hypothetical cases, 
however, are for household members aged 65 who expect to remain in the 
same house until death. As is shown below (and as Venti and Wise also men- 
tion), housing equity matters much more for a sizable fraction of the popula- 
tion: those with low income and above age 75. 
The 1989 PSID wealth data are used to sample households with heads over 
age 65 and with reported money income in excess of  $2,000. All values are 
weighted by  the 1989 population weights. I calculate the annuity-equivalent 
value of housing wealth and contrast that with money income of  the house- 
hold.8  One can therefore infer the potential impact on retirement consumption 
of a change in housing wealth (holding constant the price of housing services). 
For example, if  a household's  housing equity could be annuitized so that it 
yields 30% of money income, then a 47% slide in housing prices would reduce 
potential retirement consumption by nearly fifteen percentage points. 
The annuitized value of housing is straightforward to calculate for single 
male or single female homeowners over age 65 by appropriate  use of life tables 
and assuming a real interest rate of 3%. For couples, I assume that the annuity 
contract corresponds to a payment until the last member of the couple dies.9 
8. This measure is different from the Venti and Wise (1991) calculation. It corresponds to the 
value of cashing out the house today and placing the money in a (perfect) annuity. By contrast, the 
Venti and Wise annuity measure corresponds to the present value of  the remaining housing equity 
at death. In their case, the homeowner is allowed to remain in the house until death. 
9. I am grateful to Michael Palumbo for letting me use his life tables for these three groups; see 
Palumbo ( 1993). 252  Jonathan S. Skinner 
Table 8.2 presents the distribution of annuitized housing wealth (net of mort- 
gage balances), as a percentage of income, by both age and household money 
income.l0  For example, table 8.2 indicates that 23.86% of families aged 65-74, 
and with income less than $15,000, hold annuitized values of  housing that 
exceed their money income by 50%. Forty percent of households aged 74 and 
above, and with money income less than $20,000, hold housing equity that 
exceeds 50% of money income. Even a 25% decline in housing wealth could 
potentially reduce the annuitized income stream by at least 12.5% (50 X .25) 
for a nontrivial fraction of the elderly population.” 
A somewhat different calculation is to suppose that an individual sells his 
or her house and moves to smaller rental quarters; how much money is left 
over from the housing sale to finance current consumption at an annuitized 
rate? Assume that housing rental return is 6% of  the house value, and that 
the homeowner(s) move into rental property that is worth three-fourths of  the 
original house. So after the house is sold, I set aside the present value of 
the annuitized rental stream, which in each year is assumed to be 4.5% of the 
original house value. The importance of the annuitized  value of housing wealth 
that remains is shown in table 8.2 in italics.  A substantial  fraction of homeown- 
ers could still increase their income flow by downsizing their housing wealth. 
Nearly one-third of households who are over age 74, and whose income is less 
than $10,000, could increment their money income more than 50% by moving 
to smaller rental units. 
In sum, a change in housing prices may have relatively little effect on the 
annuitized income flow for the median household, especially among younger 
groups. However, it could have a large impact among a smaller group of poorer, 
older households. Furthermore, selling one’s house and moving to rental units 
can-at  least potentially-increase  money income for a nontrivial percentage 
of elderly. If housing wealth is at least plausibly important in economic deci- 
sions at retirement, then does housing wealth affect saving and consumption 
behavior? I address this question in the next two sections. 
8.6  Do Younger Households Consume Housing Windfalls? 
One explanation for the saving slowdown of the 1980s  is that housing wealth 
windfalls stimulated consumption. Capital gains from housing and land are not 
included in national income and product accounts, so a rise in the price of 
housing would have had no impact on measured income, but could cause con- 
sumption to rise. Thus the declining saving rate (as conventionally measured) 
10. Income brackets differ between the two age groups to adjust for lower average income levels 
among the “old-old.” The household’s age bracket is determined by the. age of the household head. 
11. Recall that these numbers establish only the potential for housing wealth to be important. 
Annuity markets are not sufficiently developed to allow homeowners to extract their wealth at 
“fair” rates. Also, the presented numbers assume. that the price of housing services has not changed 
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Table 8.2  The Annuity Value of Housing Wealth Relative to Income, 1989 
Ratio of Annuitized Housing Wealth to 
Income 
Percentage  Not 
of  Sample  Homeowner  (20%  20-50%  >50% 
Age 65-74,  income <  $15,000 
Age 65-74,  income $15-25.000 
Age 65-74,  income > $25,000 
Age 65-74,  total 
Age > 74, income < $10,000 
Age > 74, income $10-20,000 
Age > 74, income >  $20,000 

































22.17  23.86 
21.06  14.77 
41.37  16.73 
32.46  5.71 
38.41  8.52 
17.61  2.82 
32.86  16.50 
22.64  8.16 
10.38  38.37 
15.72  31.67 
18.19  40.61 
30.62  25.12 
46.85  17.18 
44.30  9.72 
22.59  33.04 
27.58  23.83 
Source: Panel Study of  Income Dynamics. 
Notes: The numbers in roman typeface are the percentage of each age and income group for whom 
the annuity value of  their house is within the given percentage of  1989  household money income. 
The numbers in italics are the percentage of each age and income group for whom the annuity 
value of  their house minus the annuity value of the assumed cost of the rental housing is within 
the given percentage of  1989 household money income. 
could have been the consequence of  increased consumption by  homeowners 
flush with windfall housing gains (Skinner 1994; Munnell and Cook 1991). 
There have been two general approaches to testing this hypothesis.I2 First, 
aggregate linear time-series consumption  functions have been estimated, using 
housing wealth as an independent variable. Bhatia (1987) used housing wealth, 
and Hendershott and Peek (1989) used tangible assets, to estimate that con- 
sumption rose between 4 and 5 cents per dollar of housing equity. 
The second approach is to use microeconomic panel data. An important 
study by Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) documented the dramatic 
decline in household saving during the 1980s using both the Survey of  Con- 
sumer Finance (SCF) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). They 
found that much of the observed decline in saving rates between 1963 and the 
1980s (in the case of  the SCF) and between 1972-73  and the 1980s (in the 
case of the CES) occurred among homeowners. For example, using the SCF, 
the saving rate declined by 6.4% for homeowners between 1963 and 1983-85, 
12. See Skinner (1994) for a review of the literature on housing and saving. 254  Jonathan S. Skinner 
but declined by only 0.5% for renters.I3  One problem with their comparisons 
is that owner-occupied housing is prevalent among older and higher-income 
families, so that the implicit control group-older  families who do not own a 
house-may  not provide a valid comparison, given how little they save. 
Skinner (1989) followed a different microeconomic approach by using the 
panel aspect of the PSID to construct changes in family specific consumption 
(a weighted sum of consumption components  in the PSID), and to regress these 
changes on income changes and housing price changes, using the Euler ap- 
proach. Those results suggested that housing price shifts had no effect on con- 
sumption.I4 
8.6.1  New Tests Using Aggregate Time-Series Data 
Consider first the conventional Euler approach (e.g., Hall 1988; see Deaton 
1992) expressing consumption changes as a random walk; 
lnC, -  lnC,-, = px + E, 
where x comprises both factors that should matter (e.g., ex ante interest rates) 
and factors that, by the logic of intertemporal optimization, should not matter 
(e.g., lagged income and stock market changes). The variable E  is typically 
unspecified, but it reflects the change in consumption that reflects new infor- 
mation revealed between time t - 1 and time t.  The approach below is to 
measure whether changes in housing wealth between t and t -  1  affect E, and 
hence consumption choices, conditional on lagged consumption. One cannot 
place strong structural interpretations on these contemporaneous shocks, but 
they do allow one to ask whether the magnitude of the partial correlation be- 
tween housing wealth and consumption is consistent with simulated marginal 
propensities of consumption.‘5 
The change in housing wealth is defined to be the real change in the value of 
owner-occupied housing structure plus land, less real net investment in owner- 
occupied housing (Federal Reserve  System  1993a,  1993b). Stock market 
wealth  changes are the  revaluation of  household-owned corporate equity, 
based on Federal Reserve System (1993a), after adjusting for inflation. This 
definition  of  stock wealth  therefore excludes pension  wealth.  Percentage 
changes in real housing wealth and real stock wealth are used as independent 
variables, along with the real change in disposable personal income (results 
are similar when real earnings are used). 
13. Surprisingly, the same pattern was not repeated in Canada. Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabel- 
haus calculated that, in Canada between 1978 and 1986, saving rates fell by 1.3% for homeowners 
and by  3.1% for renters. 
14. A study by Levin (1992) finds similar results for families in the panel Retirement History 
Survey. His sample consists of those nearing retirement or already retired, so they are not, strictly 
speaking, “young” homeowners. 
15. The estimated regression result may also reflect anticipated changes in housing prices if, for 
example, wealth gains are serially correlated, although there is little evidence of serial correlation 
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Figure 8.1 displays a graph of changes in housing wealth and changes in the 
log of  total consumption (less durables) for each year  1950-92.  The graph 
shows a strong positive correlation between housing wealth shifts and con- 
sumption growth, although the correlation is dominated by  1990, in which 
there was both a substantial drop in housing wealth and slow consumption 
growth. (It is shown below that excluding the anomalous years 1990 and 1991 
yields similar results.) 
Regressions that control for changes in disposable personal income (DPI) 
and changes in the stock market are presented in table 8.3. While changes in 
DPI exert a strong influence on consumption changes, the stock market vari- 
able has little effect.I6  The regression implies that a 1% increase in housing 
wealth raises consumption by 0.10% (with a t-statistic of 2.5). Converting this 
to a marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth (multiplying by the 
ratio of consumption to housing wealth) yields roughly 6 cents per dollar of 
housing wealth, which is larger than would be  suggested by  the life-cycle 
model. 
Figure 8.2 shows the residuals of consumption and housing wealth changes 
conditional on changes in stock markets and DPI with the years 1990 and 1991 
excluded; the estimated coefficient, shown in the figure, is 0.131, with a t- 
statistic of 2.5.l’  Splitting the sample into two parts, 1950-70  and  1971-92, 
had little effect on the housing wealth coefficients, 0.184 (t-statistic of 2.3) for 
the earlier period and 0.114 (t-statistic of 2.0) for the later period. In short, the 
large and significant marginal propensity to consume out of  housing wealth 
seems robust to different selections of sample years. 
Including the after-tax interest rate (columns 2 and 3 in table 8.3) affects the 
coefficient on housing wealth only when the model is run using two-stage least 
squares with consumption growth lagged two years and DPI growth lagged 
both one and two years as instruments. In column 3, the coefficient on housing 
wealth is reduced to 0.071, insignificant but still implying a large marginal 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth. 
Housing wealth appreciation may be a leading indicator of future income 
gains, rather than exerting an independent effect on consumption. To  control 
for this more fully, both lagged and lead changes in DPI are included in the 
consumption regression. The lead change in DPI is significant and reduces 
the coefficient on housing wealth to 0.052, which is roughly consistent with 
the life-cycle model (although the coefficient is no longer significant). Finally, 
column 5 in table 8.3 presents coefficient estimates for just nondurables. This 
controls for any spurious correlation between imputed housing values in con- 
sumption services and housing wealth. The coefficient on housing wealth is 
16. Blinder and Deaton (1985) use much the same framework to find that shocks in unantici- 
pated wealth affect consumption growth, although they do not distinguish among different types 
of wealth. 
17. That is, the horizontal axis is the residual of housing wealth, and the vertical axis the residual 
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Table 8.3  Euler Equation Consumption Regressions (%) 
Dependent 
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Fig. 8.2  Percentage consumption  change and housing wealth capital gains, 
1950-92:  conditional on income, stock market changes 
0.143, with a t-statistic of 2.5. In sum, the evidence suggests a strong partial 
correlation between housing wealth and consumption. 
8.6.2  New Tests Using Microeconomic Data 
The next step is to consider microeconomic tests of whether housing wind- 
falls affect saving behavior. To do this, I use the 1989 wave of the PSID that 
includes detailed information on wealth in both 1984  and 1989. The 1989  wave 
contains a key variable, “active” saving, that attempts to net out capital gains 
(inactive gains) from the overall change in wealth between 1984 and  1989. 
Active saving is well suited to addressing the question of how housing wind- 
falls affect saving choices. However, the definition of active saving makes it 
difficult to correct for inflation, and presupposes that households do not offset 
active saving in response to “inactive” saving through capital gains in stock, 
pension, and business assets. 
Despite the attempt to remove inactive saving from this measure, the five- 
year saving rates are highly skewed. In the sample of households considered 
below, the mean of  active saving is $10,918, with  a standard deviation of 
$324,980.  The problem of handling the very large outliers without ad hoc pro- 
cedures for excluding observations suggests the use of quantile (median) re- 
gressions. The disadvantage of quantile regressions is that the estimated coef- 
ficients are for median savers, not average savers. 
The household was included in the sample if total family money income was 
at least $l,OOO in each year (in 1989 dollars), if the households were less than 258  Jonathan S. Skinner 
age 61, did not move, had a house worth at least $2,000, and did not experience 
a major change in family composition during the 1984-89  period. A total of 
1,970 families remained. Quantile regressions, weighted by  the 1989 family 
weights, are presented in table 8.4. Note that the Income 1984 variable, for 
example, is income reported in the 1984 wave of the PSID, but it is asked about 
the previous calendar year. 
The first column describes the quantile regression for the entire sample. The 
(dollar) change in real housing capital gains (less home-improvement costs) is 
shown in the first row. The coefficient on housing wealth is -2.5  cents (with a 
t-statistic of 2.28). How might this be converted to annual changes in saving, 
since the active saving measure reflects a five-year shift in wealth? Assume the 
housing price change occurs in the midpoint of the five-year period, then the 
coefficient should be divided by 2.5. Hence the coefficient in column 1 of table 
8.4 implies a I-cent reduction in saving for every dollar increase in housing 
wealth, a number somewhat less than the life-cycle model with either moving 
constraints or the absence of reverse mortgages, but equal to that implied by 
the precautionary saving 
Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) suggest that much of the decline 
in saving was the consequence of older rather than younger households. Col- 
umns 2 and 3 in table 8.4 therefore separate families headed by someone aged 
45 or older from those less than 45. The results show that the estimated mar- 
ginal effect is much larger for younger households, equal to a reduction of 5.4 
cents in saving per dollar increase in housing wealth (or 2.1 cents after con- 
verting to annualized saving rates). This result casts doubt on the proposition 
that  older households’ saving behavior is more sensitive to a given  dollar 
change in housing values. However, the overall impact of  a given percentage 
increase in housing values may  still fall more heavily on older households, 
since they tend to own more expensive houses. Quantile regression estimates 
that controlled for the presence of  second mortgages, a possible indicator of 
households eager to spend down their wealth (Manchester and Poterba 1989), 
yielded similar results but are not reported here. 
Finally, consider the same regression with positive and negative housing 
wealth gains separated (columns 4 and 5, table 8.4). The coefficients suggest 
that housing wealth gains are treated much differently than housing wealth 
declines. For those younger than 45, the results imply an increase in saving of 
10 cents per dollar decline in housing wealth (after converting to annualized 
saving rates); by  contrast, the effect on saving of  increasing housing capital 
gains is only 0.4 cents, and insignificant. How should these results be interpre- 
ted? One possibility is that most homeowners in  1984 anticipated housing 
wealth gains during the next five years. For those who did experience a gain, 
18. The model estimates also provide an estimate of the long-term marginal propensity to save 
from income. Summing up the income coefficients and dividing by five yields an estimate of  the 
marginal propensity to save equal to 8 cents per dollar of permanent income. 259  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
Table 8.4  Quantile Regressions for Active Saving: Homeowners Who Did Not Move, 
Age I  60 
Housing Capital Gains 




Age 2 45  Age < 45 
(2)  (3) 
Age 2 45  Age < 45 
(4)  (5) 
Housing capital gains 
Housing capital gains 







Change in family 
size, 1984-89 
Income in 1984 
Income in 1985 
Income in 1986 
Income in 1987 
Income in 1988 



























-  940 
- 13,563 
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Note: Absolute value of r-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable is the level of active saving during 
1984-89. 
the increased wealth was anticipated, and hence had no impact on consump- 
tion. But for those who experienced a loss, the loss was unanticipated, and 
hence engendered a real change in consumption and saving behavior. 
In sum, the macrodata have suggested large effects, and the microdata more 
modest effects, of housing wealth on saving. The results taken together with 
Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) suggest that the empirical rate at 
which housing wealth is spent down by younger households is not inconsistent 
with the life-cycle models that allow for households to tap into housing equity, 260  Jonathan S. Skinner 
and the precautionary saving model. It is inconsistent with the view of housing 
wealth as a sideshow. 
8.7  Do Households Consume Housing Equity at Retirement? 
The next empirical question is whether retired households spend housing 
windfalls by  downsizing their houses. In practice, this question is difficult to 
answer because of the difficulty in matching all housing windfalls from past 
years with current retirees. So I address a more general question-do  house- 
holds, most of whom experienced housing windfalls during the 1970s, down- 
size housing to spend accumulated housing wealth during retirement? Presum- 
ably, a negative answer to the second question implies a negative answer to 
the first. 
A number of recent studies have found little evidence of the gradual down- 
sizing of home equity implied by the life-cycle model (Merrill 1984;  Venti and 
Wise 1989, 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 1989). In fact, these studies have 
found that retired households on average are as likely to increase their housing 
equity as to decrease it. Merrill (1984) reports that more retired households 
switch from renters to owners, than from owners to renters, not a transition 
normally associated with life-cycle “downscaling.”  Additional evidence comes 
from Feinstein and McFadden (1989), who suggest that more than one-third 
of elderly households reside in dwellings with at least three more rooms than 
the number of inhabitants, and are hence “overconsuming”  housing services. 
Sheiner and Weil(l992) present persuasive evidence that elderly households 
do reduce their housing services, although it generally occurs later in the life 
cycle and is often precipitated by  widowh~od.’~  For example, the homeown- 
ership rates of all women aged 65-69  is 77%; by  ages 80-85  the percentage 
drops to 59, with less than half owning their house after age 85. They also 
report that, for widows, homeownership  falls by twelve percentage points, and 
median home equity by  roughly 30%, in the four years after the husband’s 
death. Based on comparisons of  homeownership for high- and low-income 
households, they suggest that these changes in housing tenure are a conse- 
quence of taste changes rather than of financial necessity.*O 
The results below use data from the 1989 wave of the PSID to shed light on 
this question. I first consider differences in income patterns between those who 
moved and those who did not, and focus in particular on those who both moved 
and extracted housing equity. I then use quantile regressions to  consider at 
19. Venti and Wise (1989) and Feinstein and McFadden (1989) earlier noted the strong impact 
of  events such as widowhood, children moving, or divorce on mobility decisions, but did not 
directly test the impact of  such changes on ownership patterns. Also see Hurd (1989) and Hurd 
and Shoven (1989) for documentation  of financial changes precipitated by  widowhood. 
20. Feinstein and McFadden (1989) suggest that families with both low incomes and low levels 
of  liquid wealth are more likely to switch from owner-occupied to rental property conditional 
on moving. 261  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
what rate the equity removed (or put into) housing was reflected in changing 
consumption patterns. 
To  examine the pattern of housing wealth change among the elderly, I con- 
sider all those who were both homeowners and over the age of  54 in  1989. 
Consider three groups: those who did not move during the period 1984-89 
(85.9%), those who moved and increased the market value of  their house 
(5.8%), and those who moved  and reduced the market value of  their house 
(8.3%). Their weighted median and average family money income levels are 
presented in table 8.5 by year. Observations are not excluded because of family 
composition changes, since such changes are often causes of income declines 
(or increases in the case of  remarriage). On average, those who moved into 
smaller houses were 1.5 years older than those who moved into larger houses. 
For the group that did not move, median income declined by  19%, and mean 
income by  12% during the period. This is the likely consequence of a decline 
in labor income during retirement. Among those increasing housing equity, 
median and mean income declined by  14 and 6%, a smaller amount than the 
benchmark for nonmovers. Finally, for those moving into smaller houses, me- 
dian income dropped by  25%, and mean income fell by 32%, substantially 
more than the reference group. Note that the mean and median income for this 
latter group was nearly identical in  1982 to that for the group who did not 
move at all. Figure 8.3 shows these patterns, with 1982 income normalized at 
one hundred. After adjusting for the general downward trend in income, the 
pattern suggests that, even at retirement, changes in family income exert a 
strong influence on housing demand. 
A different view of this pattern is to normalize the level of  income by  its 
amount relative to the year in which the family moved. Figure 8.4 shows these 
calculations. If  individuals moved in 1986, for example, their T - 1 income 
Table 8.5  Mean and Median Income of Homeowners, by Moving Status, 1984 
Year 
Moved into Larger  Moved into Smaller 
Did Not Move  House  House (or Rented) 

































































Notes:  All medians and means weighted by PSID  population weights. Age of head in 1984 is 55 or above. 262  Jonathan S. Skinner 
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Average income by moving status, by year relative to move 
level is from the 1986 wave (applicable for 1985), and their T + 1 income level 
is from the 1988 wave. Both samples show a decline in family income in years 
T -  3 and T -  2. The difference becomes apparent in the year of the move, 
where income of  those who increased housing wealth flattens out (or rises 
relative to trend), while income of those who downsized continues to fall. 263  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
In sum, families who experience an income downturn appear to be more 
likely to cash out their housing wealth than those who do not, a result that is 
consistent with much of  the previous literature. Partly this is because of  a 
change in family composition; of those who reduced housing equity, 19% had 
become widows or widowers during 1984-89, compared to 10%  for those who 
did not move. However, it is not just family composition that matters; 18% of 
those who increased housing equity were widows.21 
A better predictor of housing wealth reductions is unexpected shocks, such 
as health reasons and widowhood. For those who moved, 35% responded that 
they did so because of  outside events such as health reasons, divorce, retire- 
ment because of health, or eviction. Of those who replied that their move was 
precipitated by  an unexpected shock, 79% reduced their net housing equity.22 
In sum, widowhood is not the only initiating reason for downsizing. A decline 
in income or an unexpected health problem also initiates households to tap 
into housing equity. 
Is the housing equity spent? Past studies have had difficulty finding the pro- 
ceeds of housing sales in subsequent asset reporting (Sheiner and Weil 1992), 
suggesting that the entire housing proceeds are spent in a few years. I now 
consider how housing equity extracted from the sale of housing affects active 
saving. Note that, when the house is sold, for say $50,000, active saving is 
decreased by  $50,000 unless the money is returned through the purchase of 
other assets. A coefficient of 1  .O  corresponds to housing wealth being entirely 
spent by  1989. The null hypothesis corresponds to housing wealth being en- 
tirely saved. Table 8.6 reports quantile regressions of  the type discussed in 
section 8.6, with the sample restricted to homeowners aged 55 and above in 
1984. Net proceeds from the house sale are defined to be negative for those 
who move to smaller houses, zero for nonmovers, and positive for those buying 
a larger house. 
The coefficient on the net proceeds from the house sale is 69 cents per dollar 
of housing wealth change (column 1 of  table 8.6), and is highly significant. 
This result implies that, by  1989, 69 cents of  every dollar withdrawn from 
housing sales has been consumed, and 31  cents saved, from the typical hous- 
ing sale. 
It is likely that the coefficient of housing wealth on saving differs depending 
on whether the household increased or decreased its housing equity, and when 
during the sample period the house was sold. To test this, consider four catego- 
ries of housing wealth change, shown in column 2 of table 8.6. For those who 
sold their house in  1985-86  and reduced housing equity, 73 cents of  every 
2  1. An  alternative explanation for the increase in housing equity among some widows is that 
they moved from a large house with a mortgage to a smaller house bought with cash, although 
few people over age 65 hold mortgages. 
22. By contrast, 21% who moved did so because of “purposive consumption reasons,” conven- 
tional anticipated life-cycle reasons involving reduced space or lower rent. See question V1665  1 
in the 1989 PSID. 264  Jonathan S. Skinner 
Table 8.6  Quantile Regressions for Active Saving, Homeowners  Aged > 55 
Equation 1 Coefficient  Equation 2 Coefficient 
Net housing wealth 
Net housing wealth: sale in 1985-86, 
moved to less costly house 
(or rented) 
moved to less costly house 
(or rented) 
moved to more costly house 
moved to more costly house 
Net housing wealth: sale in 1987-89, 
Net housing wealth: sale in 1985-86, 
Net housing wealth: sale in 1987-89, 
Age 
Age2 
Income in 1984 
Income in 1985 
Income in 1986 
Income in 1987 
Income in 1988 



















































Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
dollar was spent by  1989. In contrast, those who sold their house later in the 
sample period, 1987-89,  spent only 59 cents on each dollar. These coefficients 
taken together imply that roughly half of housing wealth is spent near the time 
of  the housing sale, with an additional 5 cents per initial dollar of  housing 
capital (net of interest) spent in subsequent years. 
People who "upsized" by moving into more expensive housing did not ap- 
pear to do so by  spending down reported assets; the coefficient exceeds 1.0 
regardless of when the housing transaction occurred. Perhaps realized capital 
gains or other sources of wealth not measured by active saving were used to 
finance the housing expansion. In sum, each year a small group of individuals 
downsize their housing stock in response to an adverse shock to disposable 
family income. For this group, housing wealth appears to be used in financing 265  Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow? 
extraordinary consumption in the year of the sale, and in financing subsequent 
consumption at an approximate actuarial rate. 
8.8  Conclusion 
Recent fluctuations in housing prices have  led to some concern that the 
windfall gains enjoyed by many of those currently retired could be matched in 
the future by windfall losses when the baby-boom generation retires. This pa- 
per has considered whether housing price fluctuations play  an important or 
unimportant role in the economic security of retirees-that  is, whether hous- 
ing wealth is just a sideshow to the determination of consumption and saving. 
The empirical results in this and other papers present a somewhat paradoxi- 
cal view of housing wealth. On the one hand, housing wealth does appear to 
affect the saving behavior of homeowners prior to retirement. The microesti- 
mates in this paper suggest that, for younger homeowners, a $1 increase in 
housing wealth reduces saving by  1-2  cents, a magnitude consistent with the 
certainty life-cycle and the precautionary saving model. The macroestimates 
are substantially larger, corresponding to a roughly 6-cent increase in con- 
sumption when housing wealth rises by $1. 
According to the life-cycle model, if households respond to housing wind- 
falls while young by  saving less for retirement, they should be using those 
housing windfalls while old to help finance retirement consumption. However, 
the results suggest that housing wealth windfalls affect consumption for the 
elderly only for a small group of people buffeted by adverse economic events. 
One way  to reconcile these two empirical regularities is to view housing 
wealth as a precautionary “buffer” that can be cashed out in the event of  an 
income or a health downturn, or widowhood, when the demand for housing 
services is likely to decline as well. This precautionary saving view of  the 
household can potentially explain the puzzle of  why housing wealth affects 
saving while young but is rarely used by the elderly to finance consumption. If 
housing wealth declines, households hold less insurance against future contin- 
gencies and will respond by saving more to build up (nonhousing) wealth for 
future contingencies during retirement. Since not every elderly household en- 
counters a bad outcome requiring the liquidation of housing equity, one can 
also explain why the median elderly family doesn’t spend down its housing 
wealth. 
Viewing housing wealth as a buffer against contingencies during retirement 
can also explain why the demand for reverse mortgages has not been strong. 
Retired households do not wish to draw down their housing equity in the good 
states of the world because it is a contingency against the bad state of  the 
world. And if  the bad state of the world occurs-poor  health or a serious fi- 
nancial  setback-households  desiring  to  economize on  housing  services 
would want to sell their house in any case. At that point, equity in the house 
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A somewhat different issue is whether housing prices will decline by  as 
much as Mankiw and Weil(l989) suggest. In a general equilibrium model of 
housing demand and supply, McFadden (1992) predicts a gradual flattening of 
housing prices in the future, rather than the sharp decline forecast by Mankiw 
and Weil (1989).23  And while baby-boom homeowners are clearly worse off 
than early generations that shared in the dramatic upswing in housing prices, 
McFadden finds that the impact of these differences on consumer welfare are 
quite small. He predicts that feasible lifetime consumption for generations 
born around 1950 will be lower by  only 0.7%  because they lost out on the 
housing capital gains of the earlier generations. 
Suppose that the McFadden projections are correct, and aggregate housing 
prices remain stable for the next forty years. Then wouldn’t the logic of this 
model suggest that housing prices should be unimportant? The answer is no, 
for two reasons. First, I use as a benchmark housing equity of a generation 
that has profited from the large housing price increases of the 1970. Current 
households may expect more housing wealth appreciation  than actually occurs, 
a result given support by the empirical findings that housing wealth downturns 
exert a much larger impact on saving than housing wealth upswings. If house- 
holds make saving plans based on expected housing wealth appreciation,  their 
retirement plans may be inadequate if housing prices remain constant. 
Second, and more important, there are wide regional variations in housing 
wealth and housing prices even when aggregate price indices are flat. House- 
holds in the Northeast during the late 1980s, for example, experienced wide 
fluctuations (both positive and negative) in  housing prices during a period 
when aggregate prices were relatively constant. Both of these considerations 
suggest that the economic well-being of future and current generations will be 
affected by whether they made money, or lost money, on their house. That is, 
housing wealth is not a sideshow. 
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Comment  John B. Shoven 
This paper is about a very important topic, and it exhibits much of the usual 
clarity of thought that one associates with the author. We know that housing 
wealth represents a large fraction of total household wealth for many Ameri- 
cans, particularly the elderly. The question that Skinner addresses is what 
would be the consequences if the same demographic  forces that drove up hous- 
ing prices so dramatically in the 1970s were to drive them sharply lower over 
the next few decades. The author uses the 1989 projection of Mankiw and Weil 
of  a 47% decline in real housing prices over the next thirty years or so as a 
backdrop for his evaluation of whether changes in housing prices affect aggre- 
gate consumption, saving, and individual economic welfare. 
The Mankiw and Weil prediction comes about because they forecast a sharp 
decline in the growth in housing demand as the baby-boom generation ages 
and as the baby-bust generation enters into its home-buying years. A couple of 
things should be noted about the Mankiw and Weil prediction and its impact 
on Skinner’s study. First, if the slowdown in the growth of housing demand is 
predictable and well understood, it would be anticipated and would affect 
housing prices today as well as in the future. To  the extent that declines in 
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housing prices were not surprises, but rather anticipated, they  would not be 
expected to affect consumption and saving decisions significantly as the ex- 
pected decline indeed occurs. The point of this is that, in an empirical investi- 
gation of the effect of changes in housing prices on consumption and saving, 
it would be desirable to be able to separate surprising price changes from those 
that were anticipated.  This would be difficult and is not attempted in Skinner’s 
paper. Second, the very uneven demographic structure of the U.S. population 
can be expected to affect asset prices more generally, not just housing prices. 
For example, pension funds have been accumulating assets and contributing 
massively toward national saving in  the past ten to fifteen years. However, 
when the baby-boom generation retires, one can anticipate that pension funds 
will cease being net accumulators of assets and may in fact attempt net sales 
of the stocks and bonds that the baby-boom generation has set aside for retire- 
ment. This change on the part of  pension funds could affect real interest rates, 
stock prices, and housing prices, for that matter. If  the pattern of pension fund 
demands for assets is anticipated, the effects on saving and consumption may 
already be operative and the uneven demographic structure may  already be 
affecting intertemporal asset prices. 
Housing assets are different in important ways  from other assets. First, 
owner-occupants both own an asset and consume the services generated from 
that asset. In one sense, owning a house is a bit like having a lifetime subscrip- 
tion to a magazine or a lifetime membership in a golf club. If you own one of 
these lifetime claims and do not intend to sell it, then changes in the price of 
lifetime memberships does not affect your welfare. This phenomenon is one 
of the reasons that Skinner is writing this paper; it opens up the possibility that 
changes in housing prices are just a sideshow and do not have major welfare 
implications. Presumably assets such as stocks, bonds, and bank accounts do 
not directly provide consumable services in the same way as a house does, and 
therefore the welfare consequences of changes in their value is less ambiguous. 
Second, one needs to keep in mind the significant difference between the ef- 
fects of  price levels and the effects of  anticipated price changes. Expected 
price declines would cause an increase in the rental cost of housing while a 
low level of housing prices would translate into a low imputed rent for owning 
a home. Ideally one would separately include in one’s investigation of the ef- 
fect of  housing prices on saving, consumption, and welfare both price-level 
effects and price-change effects. 
One of the reasons that this is an important paper is that, as is often the case, 
economists have a surplus of theories regarding the effect of changes in hous- 
ing prices on behavior. Skinner examines four widely used models regarding 
lifetime consumption and asset allocation and finds their predictions quite dis- 
tinct. This raises one’s hopes that maybe the facts can sort out the theories for 
us. There are several reasons why house prices could be simply a sideshow. 
First, people might behave as if they lived forever, perhaps because of a be- 
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If people lived forever (and if houses provided an infinite stream of housing 
services), then changes in housing prices would not affect those who were 
never going to sell. Second, institutional constraints such as high moving costs 
and capital market imperfections (such as an absence of reverse annuity mort- 
gages) and a lack of a bequest motive might combine so as to make a home- 
owner indifferent to the price of her or his home. Finally, people might treat 
housing assets separately from other financial assets (in a separate “mental 
account”) and not think of them as marketable, liquid assets. 
There are other economic models that tell us that house prices should matter 
for consumption and saving decisions. First, the traditional life-cycle model 
predicts dissaving during retirement, including the downsizing of one’s house. 
Second, a precautionary saving model would suggest that housing equity can 
serve as a valuable contingent asset in the event that the household experiences 
bad financial luck. These models would place houses as one of the assets in a 
“self-insurance” system for the household. Higher equity in a house would 
improve the condition of the self-insurance  fund. Finally, if you have a general 
bequest motive and not one defined only in terms of housing, then higher house 
values implies larger bequests, and this will affect one’s complete lifetime con- 
sumptiodsaving plan. 
I think that Skinner’s investigation into which of these models most closely 
conforms to observations is interesting. I also must admit to some pleasure in 
my reading of his conclusion that the precautionary motive for saving is most 
consistent with the facts. The simple life-cycle model fails because the elderly 
as a whole do not reduce their housing demand as much as that model would 
predict. The infinite-horizon model fails because changes in housing prices do 
affect behavior, a great deal for a minority of the population. I find the institu- 
tional-rigidities model fairly unconvincing because I think that capital markets 
are pretty well developed. For instance, even if there are not widely available 
reverse annuity mortgages, the elderly can still consume a good fraction of 
their home equity while remaining in their house. They could do this by using 
traditional mortgages or home equity loans. The fact may be that most of them 
do not consume their equity, but this does not support the model that constrains 
them for doing so. In fact, in the precautionary savings model only those who 
experience economic setbacks would be expected to avail themselves of  the 
equity in their home (either by borrowing or by selling). 
I found Skinner’s investigation into whether the “middle-aged” change their 
saving and spending habits depending on house appreciation interesting, but 
to be honest I don’t think that he added much to the Bosworth, Burtless, and 
Sabelhaus study that he references. They found that the much-documented de- 
cline in savings rates between the 1960s and 1980s was much more dramatic 
for homeowners than for nonhomeowners. In fact, almost all of the decline in 
personal saving was accounted for by  homeowners. This is pretty solid evi- 
dence that homeowners were increasing consumption and spending some of 
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macro- and a microanalysis. The microstudy uses new data and finds qualita- 
tively the same result as Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus, so it can be inter- 
preted as verifying and supporting their conclusion. The macroanalysis is also 
broadly consistent. 
Skinner provides ample evidence that, for a large subset of the elderly, hous- 
ing wealth is important enough to make the investigation worthwhile. He finds 
that those who suffer income declines are much more likely to tap their home 
equity. He finds that, while for most people their ex post behavior will not be 
that different with dramatically lower housing prices than it would have been 
in the absence of such a decline, for the minority who are forced to use the 
self-insurance value of having considerable housing equity, the decline makes 
them significantly worse off. To  answer the question posed in the title of  the 
paper, housing prices are not a complete sideshow. While the consequences of 
a 47% decline in prices would not be devastating for many, it would be harmful 
to most and seriously harmful to those who are at least fortunate. 
It is my  feeling that Skinner’s findings are one more nail in the coffin for 
the simple life-cycle model and one more bit of evidence in support of the 
precautionary model of saving. This Page Intentionally Left Blank